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We examine whether activists add value to the shareholders of targets and their 
acquirers. Several findings emerge. First, acquirers of targets that have activists 
outperform acquirers of other targets in both the short and long term. Second, the 
premium received by the shareholders of targets is not affected by activism. Third, 
superior gains achieved by the acquirers of targets with activists are driven by 
non-cash deals, while the average target benefits more from cash deals. 
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It is known that activist shareholders, usually the institutional investors, seek seats 
on the company's board and exert influence on the decision-making process of the 
company. Several studies suggest that activists can enhance firm value by influencing 
several aspects of company management including business strategies and managerial 
freedom.
1
 Becht et al. (2015), among others, report that activists force the firm’s 
management to become takeover targets and the large positive abnormal returns 
received by the shareholders of such firms come in the form of a takeover premium. If 
the activists’ intervention can make positive contributions to firms’ business strategies 
and governance, then the acquisitions of such targets should be more value enhancing 
to the acquirers compared to the acquisitions of other targets. Whilst there is evidence 
to suggest that the shareholders of the activists’ target firms benefit from takeover deals, 
the question of whether acquirers of firms that are subjected to investors’ activism gain 
more remains to be investigated. Additionally, there is no evidence on whether the gain 
achieved by the acquirers of targets that are subjected to investors’ activism is 
dependent on the methods of payment in takeover deals. This is important because the 
method of payment used in settling the deal signals the sustainability of value created 
by activism, if any. In cash only deals, activists have opportunities to ‘cash and run’ 
while in non-cash deals (including stocks and other securities) activists maintain their 
stake in the merged firms. The paper, therefore, aims to fill these voids in the literature. 
More specifically, we investigate three main issues: (i) do acquirers gain more by 
acquiring targets that have been subjected to activism by investors? (ii) do targets that 
                                                 
1
 For example, Brav et al. (2008) report evidence of activist hedge funds disciplining underperforming 
management as well as changing payout policies. Clifford (2008) reports evidence of the divestiture of 
under-performing assets by the firms that are subjected to activism. Klein and Zur (2009) suggest that 
activism creates value by transferring wealth from creditors to shareholders – activists tend to pursue the 
firms to issue long-term debts and repurchase stocks. Boyson and Mooradian (2011) suggest that hedge 
fund intervention can alleviate agency costs through reductions in excess cash. Brav et al. (2014) suggest 
firms are more likely to reshape corporate innovation after the intervention of activists. Brav, Jiang, and 
Kim (2015) report that firms influenced by activists tend to change business strategies and improve 
productivity. Overall, studies suggest that activists can create value by influencing the firms’ financial 
policies, business strategies and managerial freedom. 
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are subjected to activism secure a higher takeover premium from their acquirers? and 
(iii) is the gain achieved by the acquirers of targets with activists dependent on the 
method of payment? 
 
The analysis reveals several findings. First, after controlling for the firm and deal 
specific characteristics, acquirers of targets that are subjected to investors’ activism 
outperform the acquirers of targets that do not have activists by about 2% on the 
announcement of the deal. This significant superior gain is driven by the gains from 
non-cash deals in which the activists maintain their stakes in merged firms. Similarly, 
activist involvement improves the median acquirer’s performance by about 8% during 
the post-merger period after firm and deal characteristics are controlled for, indicating 
that the additional value created for acquirers by activists is sustained in the long run. 
Second, on the announcement of the deal, targets with activists received a 20% 
premium. However, the premium received by the activists’ targets is not significantly 
different from the premium received by the shareholders of other target firms. Third, 
the acquirers of the targets that are subjected to activism benefit more in non-cash deals 
than in cash only deals (‘cash and run’).  
 
The findings have several strategic implications. First, the acquirers can benefit 
more by acquiring targets that are subjected to shareholders’ activism. Second, the 
takeover premiums received by the shareholders of targets with and without activists 
do not differ significantly. Therefore, contrary to the suggestion of some earlier 
studies, firms do not need to be sold to realize the value of the firm or be the subject 
of activism to realize the value of the firm in a takeover deal. It is, however, possible 
that the value created by activists’ actions is already reflected in the market value of 
the target before the takeover deal is announced. Hence the lack of difference in the 
premium cannot be used to challenge the value creating ability of activism. Third, the 
findings also signal differences in methods of payment preferred by acquirers and 
targets. In acquisitions of targets that are subjected to activism, acquirers are likely to 
benefit from non-cash deals such that the possible constructive role of activists in the 
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merged firm can be maintained. The preferred method of payment of target 
shareholders, however, is cash only.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops testable 
propositions drawing on the evidence available and by identifying the gaps in the 
literature. Section 3 explains how the database is constructed and outlines the methods 
used. Section 4 provides the results and their discussion. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. The Development of Testable Propositions 
2.1. Activism and firm quality 
More recently a number of studies have examined the effectiveness of hedge fund 
activism on firm performance. Briggs (2007) finds that hedge funds with significant 
stockholding are able to use wolf-pack tactics against companies to achieve some of 
their aims and force the management to bring about changes in the company strategy. 
Brav et al. (2008) report that hedge fund activists employ a variety of tactics to pursue 
their objectives and are largely successful, even though they hold a relatively small 
stake. Such activists are able to generate value because of their credible commitment to 
confront the target firm management on behalf of all shareholders. Similarly, Clifford 
(2008) reports that firms targeted by hedge fund activists earned larger excess stock 
returns and return on assets (ROA). Klein and Zur (2009) show that firms targeted by 
hedge funds earned significant positive abnormal stock returns around the initial 13D 
filing date. They also suggest that hedge funds extract cash from the firms by 
increasing the target’s debt capacity and paying out higher dividends. Butu (2013) 
argues that hedge funds play a significant role in the governance of public companies 
and cause polemic. She analysed the nature of hedge fund activism using the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and assessed the various types of 
engagement made by activist hedge funds. She found a positive market reaction around 
the announcement of hedge fund interventions. She also reports evidence of larger 




Boyson and Mooradian (2011) report that hedge fund activists improve both 
short-term and long-term operating performance of the targeted firms. Hedge funds 
themselves were also gaining from their efforts as the risk-adjusted annual 
performance of activist hedge funds was about 7% to 11% higher than non-activist 
hedge funds. Wang and Zhao (2015) found that hedge funds improve corporate 
productivity by increasing patent quantity and quality. This evidence is supported by 
He, Qiu, and Tang (2014) who found evidence of activist hedge funds generating 
long-term benefits to shareholders of target firms by enhancing their innovative 
activities. Similarly, the findings of Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang (2015) also support the 
view that the effects of hedge fund activism can be long-lasting as there was no 
evidence of declining operating performance or abnormal long-term returns even after 




Using a sample of SEC 13D filings by portfolio investors, Greenwood and Schor 
(2009) studied the association between the positive market reaction and one of the 
outcomes of aggressive forms of activism – takeover. They attribute the large excess 
stock returns of target firms (i.e. takeover premium) to the ability of hedge fund 
activists to recognize potentially undervalued companies, identifying their potential 
acquirers, and forcing them to be acquired. They found that both the announcement 
returns and the long-term abnormal returns were high for those target firms that were 
ultimately acquired, but not significantly different from zero for those target firms that 
remained independent. They also found that when the market-wide takeover interest 
fell, many activists saw a decline in the value of their portfolios. This is consistent with 
the view that the firms in the activists’ portfolios were purchased in the hope of 
securing a takeover deal. The findings of Greenwood and Schor (2009) were further 
                                                 
2
 Gantchev and Jotikasthira (2015) investigate the role of institutional trading in the emergence of 
hedge fund activism and find a positive correlation between institutional selling volume and net hedge 
fund purchases of stocks of target companies before the launch of an activist campaign. They also 
report that hedge fund activists use institutional sales to camouflage their purchases, which allows 
them to obtain additional trading gains, thereby covering their monitoring costs.  
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supported by Becht et al. (2015) who analysed nearly 1,800 interventions by activist 
shareholders in Europe, Asia and North America. In all three continents, they found 
much higher median returns to those activist engagements resulting in at least one 
observable outcome than those without any outcome. More specifically, when a hedge 
fund activist fails to change the target firm’s strategy, the activism effort is 
significantly less profitable. Although they admit that it is difficult to understand the 
source of returns generated by activism, the largest abnormal returns were generated by 
takeover transactions averaging 17.1% during the 41-day announcement period 
window. Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani (2017) also found that shareholder value 
creation from hedge fund activism occurs primarily by influencing takeover outcomes 
for targeted firms.  
 
On balance, the discussion above suggests that investors’ activism can improve the 
quality of the firm and create value through improved corporate governance and 
business strategies. It is also evident that the value of activists’ efforts is likely to 
remain in the long run. If the resulting effect of activism is the improved quality of the 
firm, then such firms should be value enhancing to their acquirers. On the other hand, it 
is also possible that the acquisitions of low Q targets by high Q acquirers create value 
for merger participants (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 1989; Servaes 1991). This suggests 
that well-managed acquirers gain superior returns when they acquire poorly-managed 
targets. Such an outcome is possible because well-managed acquirers have better 
opportunities and expertise to implement value-enhancing restructurings in 
poorly-managed targets. In contrast, the misvaluation hypothesis suggests that 
overvalued (high market-to-book ratio) firms tend to use overvalued stocks to acquire 
undervalued targets, leading to negative market reactions. Dong et al. (2006) examine 
both the Q hypothesis and the misvaluation hypothesis and find that pre-1990 
empirical evidence tends to support the Q hypothesis; whereas post-1990 empirical 
evidence tends to support the misvaluation hypothesis. Therefore, it remains an 
empirical question leading to our first testable proposition that “Acquirers gain more 
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from the acquisition of targets that have been subjected to shareholders’ activism than 




As indicted by some earlier studies (e.g. Butu 2013) shareholders benefit more 
from aggressive forms of activism. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, i.e. the 
activists are able to improve the quality of the firms and acquirers are willing to acquire 
them, the shareholders of the firms that are subjected to activism should be able to sell 
their stocks at a higher price to an acquirer. This leads to our second testable 
proposition that “Compared to other targets, firms that are subjected to activism 
secure a higher takeover premium from their acquirers.” 
 
2.2.Activists’ confidence and the method of payment 
It is also known that in a takeover deal the method of payment signals the quality 
of the deal. For instance, acquirers of private targets gain more in stock deals than in 
cash deals (Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin 2006). This is because the readiness of a 
single or a handful target owner(s) to continue to hold stakes in merged firms indicates 
that the deal is value enhancing. In the same way, if the activists are confident that their 
activism has improved the quality of the target and the value they created is sustainable 
in the long run, they are likely to be prepared to accept stocks and/or other securities in 
the merged firm and continue to hold stakes. Otherwise, they would accept only cash 
and walk away from the firm, i.e. they would prefer to ‘cash and run’. Moreover, the 
willingness of acquirer management to accept activists’ stakes (effectively their active 
role) in the merged firm also signals the quality of the management of the acquirer. 
Consequently, the market is likely to react favourably to non-cash deals compared to 
cash only deals where the management of the acquirer effectively ‘buys out’ the 
                                                 
3
 Normally, the activists dispose of their ownership of the merged firm within a very short period of 
the deal. Should the activists continue to hold the shares of the merged firm the acquirers are also 
likely to benefit from the role of the activists in improving the governance of the merged firm in the 
long run. This is particularly relevant in the cases of acquirers whose governance is sub-optimal. 
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activists. This leads to our third testable proposition that “Acquirers of targets that 
have activists gain more in non-cash deals than in cash deals.” 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1.The Sample 
The sample is comprised of US domestic merger and acquisition (M&A) deals 
subsequent to activists’ campaigns from 1994-2014. Data on activist campaigns were 
initially collected from the Thomson Reuters Shareholder Activism Intelligence 
database, which has recorded campaigns by prominent activist investors since 2000. 
Specifically, the database contains information about activist campaigns by 1038 
activists all over the world from 2000-2014. We complemented this dataset with data 
sourced from 13D filings available in SEC’s Edgar database. The Edgar database has 
recorded 13D filings for most public firms since 1994. Activist investors are required 
to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC if they acquire beneficial ownership of more than 
5% of a public firm (Greenwood and Schor 2009). A total of 5,637 13D filings were 




In order to compare the implications of activists’ type on the returns from takeover 
deals, we classify the activists into two categories: hedge fund activists and other 
activists (see Appendix B for their description). Activist types were identified by 
searching their details (using the names of activists) on the Internet. We accessed 
activists’ official websites to gather detailed information on these activist investors. 
 
Next, activist campaigns whose outcomes were takeovers had to be identified. As 
in Greenwood and Schor (2009), we define targets involving activists if they were 
acquired within 18 months of the activist’s campaign. Information on subsequent 
takeovers was obtained from Thomson One Mergers and Acquisitions database. Our 
                                                 
4
 The Thomson Reuters Shareholder Activism Intelligence (TRSAI) database includes 1038 activists 
all over the world; however, some activists do not participate in the US market. We find that 817 
activists in the TRSAI database can also be found in the Edgar database.  
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final sample includes 316 M&A deals subsequent to campaigns by 167 activists. Since 
13D filings only record information on listed companies, all M&A targets in our 
sample are publicly listed firms. Table 1 (Panel A) shows that deals involving activists 
started to increase from 1994 (two deals) and reached their peak in 2014 (25 deals). 
However, there is no particular pattern to this change. Panel B shows that 192 targets 




(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
To assess the implications of activists’ targets on acquirers’ gains (and the 
premium received by target firm shareholders) we compare the gains (and premium) 
from acquisitions of such targets against the gains from acquiring targets that did not 
have activists. To create a sample of deals that did not have activists’ involvement we 
constructed a matching sample based on acquirers’ industry, size and market-to-book 
value ratios (i.e. we followed the control firm approach of benchmarking). More 
specifically, in each industry and calendar year, we categorized acquirers into quintiles 
based on their market values. In each size quintile, acquirers were sorted on their 
market-to-book value ratios. Deals involving acquirers with market-to-book value 
ratios close to those of acquirers of targets involving activists were selected as the 
matching sample. We identified 359 matching deals that did not involve activists. The 
stock returns and financial (accounting) data, used in assessing short-term gain and 
long-term performance were obtained from CRSP and COMPUSTAT respectively.  
 
3.2.Key features of merging partners and the deals 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of key features of acquirers (Panel A) and 
targets (Panel B) of both the deals involving activists and the matching sample (see 
Appendix A for their definition). Lack of significant differences in mean/median 
                                                 
5
 The number of deals by activist groups is greater than the number of deals in total because some 
deals involved multiple activists. 
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values of the key features of merging partners (acquirers/targets) in the two categories 
of deals (activists’ sample and the matching sample) confirms their suitability for 
comparison purposes. As reported by earlier studies on M&A, targets are much smaller 
than acquirers in size and the acquirers have higher growth opportunities (M/B ratios) 
than the targets. The target firms that were subjected to investors’ activism have higher 
stock price growth in the run-up to the announcement of the deal than that of the 
matching firms. This is, possibly, due to the fact that the up to 18 months’ gap between 
the deal and the initiation of the activists’ campaign gave enough opportunity to the 
activists to improve the target firms’ performance leading to an increase in stock price 
of the targets. Panel C (Table 2) provides a summary of the key features of the deals 
involving targets with activists as well the matching sample. The estimates show that 
relatively higher proportions of the deals involving activists are settled in cash 
compared to the matching sample. This is plausible because activists may prefer cash, 
rather than stocks or other securities in merged firms, for two reasons namely: (a) ‘cash 
and run’ because of their lack of confidence in the long-term quality of the deal, 
including the sustainability of the improvement in the quality of targets they have 
achieved through activism, and (b) to move their funds to another superior investment 
opportunity (i.e. the exit strategy). 
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation between the variables used in this study. The 
estimates show very low correlation between most variables. The correlation between 
the acquirers’ announcement period returns (CAR) and bid premium (difference 
between the price offered by the acquirer and the target’s market price four weeks 
before the announcement of the deal divided by the latter) is 0.632 (Panel B) indicating 
that in deals that involve high performing targets the shareholders of both acquirers and 
targets gain more. Similarly, reasonably high correlations between cash deals and 
acquirers’ announcement period returns (0.286) and volatility in targets’ pre-bid 
returns (sigma) and bid premium are also recorded. Overall, the correlation between 
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the variables of our interest (except those noted above) are low and hence are not likely 
to cause any concern in multiple regressions. 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
3.3.Measuring announcement period gains 
Following recent studies on M&As (e.g. Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) the 
announcement period excess returns of acquirers’ shareholders are estimated using the 
market-adjusted model
6
 as in equation (1): 
                               
Where, ARi,t is the abnormal return of company i (acquirer or target) on day t; Ri,t is 
the return of company i on day t, and Rm,t is the market return on day t (measured by 
CRSP value-weighted index return). The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the 
sum of the abnormal returns over the 5-days (-2 to +2) surrounding the day of 
announcement of the deal as in equation (2): 
     ∑      
    
    
                
The excess returns of the shareholders of target companies are measured in the 
same way as the gains to the acquirers, i.e. the CAR for the 5-day event window.  
 
We also measure the gains to the shareholders of target firms using a bid premium, 
defined as the difference between the offer price and the target’s stock price four weeks 
before the announcement divided by the latter as in equation (3).  
                                                 
6
 We also estimate excess returns using the market model and the CAR for the 3-day [-1, +1] window. 
In the market model the parameters (alpha and beta) are estimated over the pre-announcement [-365, 
-28 days] period. In the interest of brevity we report the estimates based on the market adjusted 5-day 
event window and discuss other results if they are qualitatively different. The unreported estimates are 




               
          
       
         
 
In equation (3) OP is the price offered by the acquirer to the target firm and Pt-28 is 
the price of the target 28 days before the announcement of the deal. Unlike the 5-day 
event period CAR, the bid premium (equation 3) is expected to capture the relatively 
long-term movement in the value of the target, including the effects of any possible 
rumour of the takeover deal. Following Officer (2003); Golubov, Petmezas, and 





3.4.Long-term performance of acquirers 
The long-term (post-announcement) performance of both sets of acquirers (the 
sample and the matched firms) is measured by size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR) over 24 months as in equation (4):
8
  
      ∏        
    
   
 ∏        
    
   
           
where Ri,t is the monthly return of company i in month t. Rp,t is the monthly return 
for reference portfolio p in month t. 
 
In each year, we construct 50 reference portfolios based on size and 
market-to-book ratios. The reference portfolios are created in two steps. First, all US 
listed firms are sorted into deciles based on their market value. Second, within each 
size decile, firms are sorted into quintiles based on their market-to-book ratios. In 
                                                 
7
 We also conduct robustness tests by using the original values of bid premiums. The results are 
qualitatively similar. 
8
 We also estimate the BHAR over 12 months and 36 months as the robustness test. In the interest of 
brevity, however, we report the estimates based on 24-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR24) and discuss other results if they are qualitatively different. 
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The announcement period gains of acquirers and targets (CAR) are analysed using 
the t-test (two-tailed) to assess their statistical significance. The significance of 
acquirers’ long-term performance (BHAR) is examined by a t-test with bootstrapped 
standard error. The announcement period CARs received by the sample and the 
matched firms are compared using a two-sample t-test. The long-term gains of sample 
and matched acquirers are compared using a two-sample t-test by applying 
bootstrapped standard errors. Where appropriate, to test the significance of median 
gains we use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to 
compare the median gains of two sets of samples (e.g. gains from the sample and the 
matched deals).  
 
3.6.Multivariate Analysis 
We examine whether the deals that involve acquiring activists’ targets can generate 
superior announcement gains (CARi) to acquirers after controlling for the effects of 
other factors that are known to affect the acquirers’ gain, as in equation (5): 
 
                                                           
 
In equation (5) the key explanatory factor of interest to us is the Activist dummy 
that represents the presence of activists. It takes the value of 1 if the takeover target was 
subjected to activism, and 0 otherwise. Firmi is a vector of characteristics of acquirer i 
at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the deal, and Deali is a vector of 
the deal specific features pertinent to deal i. The firm and deal characteristics are 
defined in Appendix A. In estimation we also control for both the year fixed effect (ft) 




To examine the implications of activists’ involvement on the long-term 
performance of acquirers (BHARi), we estimated equation (6) which controls for the 
effects of firm and deal specific characteristics as well as year and industry fixed 
effects.
9
 Again, the key variable of interest to us is the activist dummy. 
 
                                                        6  
 
Similarly, we also examine whether target firms that have activists can secure 
higher takeover premiums (Premiumi) by estimating equation (7). Once again, the key 
variable of interest to us is the activist dummy and the equation controls for the 
possible effects of firm and deal specific factors, year and industry effects.  
 
                                                               
 
Equations (5) to (7) are estimated using OLS. Since existing literature suggests that 
BHARs are non-normally distributed, we also use quantile regression to estimate 
equation (6).  
 
As noted earlier, one of the issues that we examine is the choice of the method of 
payment. We examine this issue using two alternative definitions of dependent 
variable, viz. by estimating the probability of cash payment (equation 8), and the 
percentage of cash payment (equation 9). 
 
                                                 
9
 It is also possible that the operating performance of the acquirer is affected by the type of the targets 
acquired in the long run. To test if the acquirers of activist targets perform differently from the 
acquirers of non-activist targets, we regress ROA and ROE (separately) against a set of explanatory 
variables including activist dummy, acquirer firm characteristics and deal characteristics. The results, 





                               
                                                 
                             
                                                   
 
In equation (8) the dependent variable is a Cash dummy that equals one if the deal 
is 100% paid in cash, and 0 otherwise. In equation (9) the dependent variable is defined 
as the percentage of consideration paid in cash (transaction value paid in cash over total 
transaction value). Equation (8) is estimated using the Probit model. Since the 
percentage of cash payment is scaled 0 to 1 inclusive, equation (9) is estimated using 
the fractional Probit model. In both equations Activist is the key variable of interest. 
The model also accounts for firm and deal characteristics as well as year and industry 
effects. 
 
To control for outliers, all continuous variables in above regressions are 
winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels, except for bid premium that is discussed above. 
To check for robustness of results with respect to the effects of outliers we also use 
original values, winsorize the data at the 1% and 99% levels and at 5% and 95% levels. 
The results remain qualitatively similar. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1.Activism and announcement period gains to acquirers 
As discussed earlier, targets that are subjected to investors’ activism are likely to 
have superior financial and business strategies. Hence acquisitions of such firms 
should enhance the value of their acquirers more than the acquisitions of other targets. 
Consequently, on the announcement of deals, involving activists’ targets should 
generate relatively higher gains to acquirers. On the other hand, given the 
superior/reformed quality (at least perceived) of the target firms, they are likely to be 
attractive to many potential bidders. To minimize competition and pre-empt 
competition in acquiring such targets, potential bidders are likely to offer higher 
 
 16 
premiums to such targets, possibly close or equal to the synergy gains. Consequently, 
the acquirers may not gain on the announcement of targets that are subjected to 
activism.
10
 Therefore, whether acquisitions of activists’ targets generate higher returns 
to acquirers remains an empirical question. To address this issue, in this section, we 
compare the announcement period gains of acquirers that acquire activists’ targets 
against those of matching firms. Table 4 (Panel A) provides a comparison of the 5-day 
market-adjusted CARs (announcement period gains) of the activists’ sample and the 
matching sample. The estimates show that the acquirers of activists’ targets gain a 
positive and significant return (0.78%) on the announcement of the deal while the 
acquirers of other targets (matching sample) suffer a significant loss (-0.69%). The 
difference between their gains (1.6%) is also statistically significant, confirming that 
the acquisition of activists’ targets is superior to the acquisition of other targets. This is 
possible because the activists have already improved the governance and business 
strategies of the targets before making the firm available for acquisition.
11
 This result 
also supports the finding of Boyson et al. (2016), who found that third-party bids for 
activist targets experienced higher returns. In summary, the results support our first 
testable proposition that “Acquirers gain more from the acquisition of targets that have 
been subjected to shareholders’ activism than from the acquisition of other targets” 
and suggest that acquiring firms’ shareholders are better off by acquiring targets that 
have been subjected to activism.  
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
Next, to ensure that the superior gains to acquirers of activists’ targets is due to 
activism, rather than other factors, we estimate equation (5) to control for the 
implications of other factors that are known to affect acquirers’ gains. The results 
                                                 
10
 When judged ex post, it is possible for acquirers to end up paying more than the synergy value and 
suffer a loss on the announcement of the deal. However, ex ante, no rational manager should pay a 
premium higher than the synergy value of the deal, hence the expected lower limit of the gain is zero. 
11
 The estimates based on a 3-day event period window and market model are qualitatively similar. 
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reported in Table 5 reveal a positive and significant role effect of the ‘activist’ dummy 
on acquirers’ announcement period gains in all four specifications. Thus, combined 
with the evidence from univariate analysis discussed earlier, it can be deduced that 
acquiring a target that had an activist can generate higher returns to the acquirer in 
comparison to acquiring a target that has no activist.  
 
Other factors that affect the announcement period gains (CAR) of acquirers are the 
size of the acquirer (i.e. Ln(MV)) and the relative size of the deal. Both have an inverse 
relation with the acquirers’ returns, thereby suggesting that larger acquirers and 
relatively larger deals lead to a decline in acquirers’ announcement period returns.  
 
Thus, the results suggest that target firms’ activists can create value to acquiring 
firms’ shareholders too. More specifically, after controlling for the firm and deal 
specific factors, activists’ involvement can improve acquirers’ market value by about 2% 
within a 5-day announcement period window (Table 5, specification 4). This return 
translates into $334 million (2% × $16,696 million average acquirer size) gain to an 
average acquirer. In summary, the evidence from multivariate analysis also supports 
our first testable proposition and confirms that potential acquirers can benefit by 
identifying targets that have been subjected to investors’ activism. 
 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
4.2.Activism and Long-term performance of acquirers 
Evidence discussed above suggests that the acquiring activist’s target generates 
significantly higher gains to the bidder on the announcement of the deal. The observed 
superior announcement period gains could be a function of a quality acquisition that 
brings synergy to the acquirer. Alternatively, it is also possible that the market 
overreacts (optimistically) to such deals. This question could be resolved by assessing 
the long-term performance of the acquirers. If the market is efficient and the 
acquisition of activists’ targets is truly more value enhancing, which is already 
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reflected in the deal price, than the acquisitions of other targets, then there should be no 
significant difference in the long-term performance of deals involving activists’ targets 
and other targets. On the other hand, if the superior announcement period gains are due 
to the market’s over-optimism, then there should be a reversal in long-term returns (i.e. 
correction of earlier over-optimism) leading to inferior performance of the acquirers of 
activists’ targets. We test for these possibilities by comparing the long-term 
performance (measured by buy-and-hold abnormal returns i.e. BHARs) of the 
acquirers that acquired activists’ targets against the performance of the matching deals. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports estimates of post-merger 24-month abnormal returns 
(BHARs) of the two groups. The estimates show that the acquirers of activists’ targets 
earn higher returns than the acquirers of other targets (matching sample); however, the 
difference in their mean return is not statistically significant. The difference in median 
return, however, is weakly significant. This suggests that the long-term performance of 
acquirers of activists’ targets is at least as good as that of the acquirers of other targets. 
This evidence suggests that the observed superior announcement period gains of 
acquirers of activists’ targets were not due to the market’s overreaction. The value of 
acquirers that was enhanced during the early stage of the deal (announcement period) is 
sustained in the long run too (i.e. there is no reversal).  
 
To control for the possible implications of other factors on the long-term 
performance of the acquirers, we estimated equation (6) in which BHARs of acquirers 
are regressed against a set of explanatory variables. The results are reported in Table 6. 
Specifications 1 to 4 shows OLS regressions. The coefficient of the activist dummy is 
insignificant in the four specifications. The evidence of an insignificant difference in 
the long-term performance of the two groups of acquirers in both univariate and 
multivariate analysis suggests that the acquirers of activists’ targets perform at least as 
well as the acquirers of other targets.  
 
Since BHARs are not normally distributed, the OLS estimators could be biased. 
We also use quantile regressions to address this issue of non-normality. Specifications 
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5 to 8 show the results of quantile regressions. The coefficients of the activist dummy 
are significantly positive in three of the four specifications, suggesting that the median 
acquirer in activist-involved deals outperforms the median acquirer in the matching 
sample. In particular, once the firm and deal characteristics are controlled for, the 
activists’ involvement improves the long-term performance of an (median) acquirer by 
8.07% (Table 6, specification 8).    
   
It reconfirms that the observed superior announcement period gain of acquirers of 
activists’ targets was not due to the market’s overreaction. This is possible because the 
activists were helping the targets to improve their strategic decisions and governance 
for a sustained period of time prior to the deal which has strengthened the quality of the 
firm. Overall, the evidence discussed above supports our first testable proposition that 
“Acquirers gain more from the acquisition of targets that have been subjected to 
shareholders’ activism than from the acquisition of other targets.” Therefore, the 
evidence suggests that the managers of acquiring firms can add more value to the 
wealth of their shareholders by acquiring targets that have been subjected to 
shareholders’ activism. 
 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
4.3.Activism and the announcement period gains of targets 
Extant literature unanimously suggests that targets’ shareholders achieve 
significant positive returns on the announcement of a takeover bid. The results in 
Table 7 (panel A) show that targets both with and without activists gain around 20% 
abnormal returns (CAR) on the announcement of the deal. However, the key question 
here is whether the shareholders of targets that have activists gain more than the 
shareholders of other targets. A comparative analysis of gains for the shareholders of 
activists’ targets and other targets does not reveal any significant difference (Table 7, 
Panel A). This is possible because the market may have already incorporated the 
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value of activism at the time of the news of activism (13D filing) rather than wait 
until the firm is taken over. 
Estimates based on an alternative measure of bid premium received by the target 
firm shareholders (deal price relative to the market price of the target 4 weeks prior to 
the announcement of the deal), are presented in Panel B. The estimates confirm that 
there is no significant difference in the bid premium received by the shareholders of 
activists’ targets (46.55%) and other targets (43.44%).  
 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
We also assessed the implications of activism on gains to target firm shareholders 
in a multivariate framework that controls for the effects of other firms and deal 
specific characteristics. Target firms’ 5-day announcement period returns are 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables and the results are reported in Table 8. 
The coefficient of the activist dummy remains insignificant, indicating that the target 
firms’ returns do not depend on investors’ activism. This result is consistent with the 
evidence from our univariate analysis. The lack of significant difference in the returns 
secured by the shareholders of activist targets and other targets does not imply that 
investor activism fails to add value to target firms. It is possible that the value created 
by investor activism was already reflected in a target’s market value before the 
announcement of the deal. We therefore analyse the gains of activist targets around 
the activist campaigns. The CARs over three days [-1, 1], five days [-2, 2], eleven 
days [-5, 5], and twenty-one days [0, 20] around the activists’ campaign are 7.44%, 
7.95%, 9.03%, and 13.83% respectively.
12
 These statistically significant returns 
suggest that the market value of activists’ targets increases after the news of activism. 
Consequently, on the announcement of the deal, target firm shareholders receive only 
an average takeover premium. Overall, the evidence from the above discussion 
                                                 
12
 The unreported estimates are available on request. 
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rejects our second proposition that “Compared to other targets, firms that are 
subjected to activism secure a higher takeover premium from their acquirers.” 
 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
 
4.4.Methods of payment and acquirers’ gains 
Extant literature on M&A suggests that the acquirer’s performance is dependent 
on methods of payment. As noted earlier, the signal conveyed by the willingness of 
activists to maintain a stake in the merged firm should be much more favourable 
compared to that of ‘cash and run’. Therefore, we expect non-cash deals with activists’ 
involvement to generate higher announcement period gains to acquirers than the cash 
deals. To examine this issue, equation (5) is estimated by splitting the sample deals into 
two categories, namely (a) cash only deals, and (b) non-cash deals (i.e. all deals 
excluding cash only deals). Announcement period gains of acquirers (5-days) are 
regressed against a set of explanatory variables. The results are reported in Table 9. In 
cash only deals (specifications 1-4), the coefficients of the activist dummy are 
statistically insignificant. In non-cash deals, however, the coefficient of the activist 
dummy is positive and significant in all specifications (5-8) in Table 9. Specifically, 
activist involvement improves acquirers’ 5-day gains by 2.59% in non-cash deals 
(Table 9, specification 8). These estimates suggest that non-cash (primarily stocks) 
payment helps generate higher returns to acquirers. The evidence that acquirers gain 
more in non-cash deals (stocks) is consistent with the experience of the acquirers of 
private (unlisted) targets, in which the acceptance of stocks by the shareholders of the 
target signals a certification of the quality of the deal to the market. The signal is 
meaningful because the activists, who are likely to have access to expertise for rigorous 
due diligence and substantial post-merger holdings, are willing to accept securities (e.g. 
stocks) of the acquirer. This evidence provides further support to our third testable 
proposition that “Acquirers of targets that have activists gain more in non-cash deals 
than in cash deals.” Strategically, from the perspective of acquirers’ shareholders, it 
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looks more meaningful to bid for targets that have activists who are willing to maintain 
their stake in the merged firm. 
 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
 
4.5.Target firms’ preferred method of payment 
The results reported in Table 8 reveal a significant positive relation between the 
announcement period returns (CAR) secured by targets’ shareholders and the variable 
representing cash payment. In other words, target shareholders who sell their stocks for 
cash earn significantly higher returns. This positive evidence prompted us to test if 
there is any significant difference in the preferences of activist and non-activist target 
firms’ shareholders. To this end we split the sample into two groups – cash only deals 
and non-cash deals, and run two separate estimations. The choice of payment methods 
(cash only vs. non-cash) were regressed against a vector of explanatory variables using 
Probit (equation 8) and fractional Probit (equation 9) models. The results reported in 
Table 10 indicated by the positive and significant coefficients of the ‘activist’ dummy, 
suggest that activists’ targets prefer cash only deals compared to non-cash deals. Such 
a preference of activists looks plausible because they would like to cash in their efforts 
and move on to some other investments that may have higher return potential. The 
choice of cash only can also be considered a rational decision for other investors 
because they receive higher premiums in cash only deals than in other deals (Table 9).  
 
(Insert Table 10 about here) 
 
4.6.Types of activist and gains from acquisitions 
As discussed earlier (section 2), numerous studies show that hedge funds are 
more effective than other activists. On balance, the literature on shareholder activism 
shows differences in the effectiveness of activism led by hedge funds and other 
investors. In addition, it could be argued that, compared to a single activist, multiple 
activists working together could influence the governance and strategy of the firm 
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more effectively. Consequently, the improvement in the quality of a firm that has 
multiple activists should be better than that of a firm with a single activist. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the experience of activists adds more value to the 
outcome of activism. If so, the quality of firms that have serial (experienced) activists 
would be expected to be superior to the quality of firms that have casual activists.  
Shawky, Dai and Cumming (2012) report that sector diversification improves the 
performance of hedge funds. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the quality of a 
firm that has sector-diversified activists is better than the quality of a firm with 
non-diversified activists. Similarly, Cumming, Dai and Johan (2015) examine 
whether hedge funds registered in Delaware are different from those registered in 
other locations. They find that Delaware registered hedge funds tend to have higher 
management and incentive fees, higher watermark provision, longer redemption 
notice periods and longer lock-up periods. Although they did not find any significant 
difference in the performance of Delaware registered hedge funds and other hedge 
funds it is possible for the differences in their attributes to affect the outcome of their 
activism on M&A performance. Therefore, we also compare the outcomes of 
activism of Delaware registered and other activists. 
Overall, we compare the roles of different types of activists (hedge fund vs. others, 
multiple vs. single, serial vs. casual, sector-diversified vs sector-focused, and Delaware 
registered vs non-Delaware registered) to examine whether the benefits of activism to 
firms involved in takeover deals (both targets and acquirers) are dependent on the type 
of activists. However, the results reported in Table 11 suggest that the types of activists 
do not influence the outcome of M&A.
13
 Specifically, the results suggest similarity in 
the effectiveness of the roles of hedge funds and other activists. Neither the acquirers 
nor the target firm shareholders benefit more from the deals that involve multiple 
activists compared to a single activist. Similarly, the experience of activists does not 
                                                 
13
 Since the difference in acquirer and target gains between different types of activists are insignificant, 
in the interest of brevity we only report a concise table including regressions of CARS of acquirers and 
targets. Results of acquirers’ BHARs and bid premiums are available on request. 
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seem to make any material difference in the gains to acquirers or targets. In addition, 
the effects of shareholder activism on M&A performance do not differ across 
sector-diversified and sector-focused activists. Furthermore, activists’ registration 
place (whether activists are registered in Delaware) has no significant effect on 
acquirer or target performance.  
 
(Insert Table 11 about here) 
 
Overall, the benefits of activism to firms involved in takeover deals (both targets 
and acquirers) remain independent of the type of activist. All activists contribute 
equally to improving the quality of firms and realising their full potential, leading to 





Several studies report that activists can create significant value to a firm through 
their engagements. Greenwood and Schor (2009) attribute such excess returns 
(additional value) to the ability of the activists to force the firm to be acquired. Becht et 
al. (2015) also show that takeovers are the most popular outcome of activist 
engagements. Our paper examines whether firms that acquire targets which have been 
subjected to investors’ activism can outperform the acquirers of targets that do not have 
any activist. We analysed a sample of US domestic M&As subsequent to activist 
campaigns over the period 1994-2014. A comprehensive database on activist 
campaigns over the same period is compiled by collecting information from Thomson 
Reuters’ Shareholder Activism Intelligence database as well as from the SEC’s 
EDGAR database. Several findings emerge. 
 
First, on the announcement of takeover deals, the acquirers of targets that have 
activists’ involvement outperform the acquirers of targets that do not have any activist. 
After controlling for the firm and deal specific characteristics, activists’ involvement 
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contributes to acquirer outperformance by about 2% on the announcement of the 
takeover deal. This return translates into $334 million gain to the average acquirer. In 
other words, deals with activist involvement can create additional value to acquiring 
firms. Additionally, acquirers in activist-involved deals maintain their superior 
performance during the post-merger period. Second, the gains to target firm 
shareholders remain independent of activism. Unlike the suggestions of some previous 
studies, this evidence implies that there is no need to sell the target to a bidder to realize 
the gains of activism. It is possible that the market price of firms that are subjected to 
activism already reflects the enhanced quality of the firm. This evidence, combined 
with the evidence from a comparative analysis of an alternative measure of bid 
premium, suggests that acquirers do not overpay to the targets that have activists. On 
the contrary, they benefit more by acquiring such targets compared to targets that do 
not have activists. Third, the superior gains enjoyed by the acquirers of activists’ 
targets is largely driven by non-cash deals where the activists continue to hold their 
stakes in merged firms. Finally, the impact of activism on M&A gains remains 
independent of the type of activists.  
 
In summary, our findings suggest that acquirers can benefit more by taking over 
targets that have been subjected to investors’ activism compared to the acquisitions of 
targets that have no activists. By implication, from the perspective of target firms’ 
shareholders, it is worthwhile improving the quality of the firm before it is sold. 
Similarly, acquirers are better off by acquiring targets that have already gone through 
the improvement process. The benefit to acquirers is even higher when the activists are 
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Table 1. Distribution of deals by year and activist type 
 
This table presents deals with activist involvement from 1994-2014. Panel A reports the 
distribution of deals by sample year and Panel B reports distribution of deals by activist type.  
 
Panel A: Annual Distribution of Deals with Activist Involvement 
Year No. of Deals 
Percent 
(%) 
Year No. of Deals Percent (%) 
1994 2 0.63 2005 10 3.16 
1995 2 0.63 2006 23 7.28 
1996 10 3.16 2007 16 5.06 
1997 20 6.33 2008 21 6.65 
1998 24 7.59 2009 20 6.33 
1999 20 6.33 2010 15 4.75 
2000 15 4.75 2011 15 4.75 
2001 16 5.06 2012 11 3.48 
2002 9 2.85 2013 13 4.11 
2003 13 4.11 2014 25 7.91 
2004 16 5.06 Total 316 100.00 
Panel B: Distribution of Deals by Activist Type 
Activist Types    No. of Deals 
Hedge Funds    192 
Industrial Owners    68 
Investment Managers    51 
Individual Investors    18 
Investment Companies    13 
Financial Institutions    12 
Private Equity Companies    4 
Pensions Funds    3 
 
Note: The sum of deals by activist group is greater than the number of deals in total because some 
deals involve multiple activists. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for the sample of M&A deals 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the full sample of M&A deals, portioned by the deals with activist involvement and matching deals. Panel A, B and C show summary 
statistics for acquirer firm characteristics, target firm characteristics, and deal characteristics, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. P-Values are shown in parentheses. T-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test are used to test the difference in mean and median, respectively. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 Full Sample Activists Sample Matching Sample Difference (Activists – Matching) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
Panel A: Acquirer Firm Characteristics 
MV ($ mil.) 16696.18  1843.67  675 14799.48  2139.30  316 18365.70  1706.35  359 -3566.22  (0.220)  432.95  (0.459)  
M/B 4.12  2.41  675 3.91  2.39  316 4.32  2.41  359 -0.41  (0.322)  -0.02  (0.486)  
Leverage 0.39  0.38  673 0.40  0.37  316 0.38  0.38  357 0.03  (0.213)  -0.02  (0.277)  
Cash Flows/Equity 0.04  0.05  646 0.05  0.06  299 0.04  0.05  347 0.01  (0.416)  0.01
*
  (0.098)  
RUNUP 0.15  0.10  675 0.18  0.13  316 0.13  0.08  359 0.05  (0.102)  0.05  (0.109)  
Sigma 0.03  0.02  675 0.03  0.02  316 0.03  0.02  359 0.00  (0.495)  0.00  (0.471)  
 
Panel B: Target Firm Characteristics 
MV ($ mil.) 1540.37  201.74  554 1404.12  213.75  273 1672.75  189.07  281 -268.64  (0.393)  24.68  (0.931)  
M/B 2.48  1.78  502 2.50  1.75  249 2.47  1.78  253 0.03  (0.878)  -0.04  (0.811)  
Leverage 0.37  0.36  559 0.38  0.35  276 0.36  0.36  283 0.02  (0.497)  0.00  (0.553)  
Cash Flows/Equity -0.03  0.04  480 -0.04  0.04  238 -0.03  0.05  242 -0.01  (0.826)  0.00  (0.654)  
RUNUP 0.06  0.03  556 0.11  0.08  275 0.02  0.01  281 0.08
**
  (0.046)  0.07
**
  (0.019)  






 Full Sample Activists Sample Matching Sample Difference (Activists – Matching) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
TV ($ mil.) 1013.52  183.73  615 1055.19  233.34  286 977.31  162.79  329 77.88  (0.636)  70.55
**
  (0.028)  
Relative Size 0.35  0.16  615 0.38  0.17  286 0.34  0.15  329 0.04  (0.319)  0.03  (0.215)  
All-Cash (%) 39.89 - 569 44.61 - 269 35.67 - 300 8.94
**
 (0.030)  - - 
All-Stock (%) 29.17 - 569 24.91 - 269 33.00 - 300 -8.09
**
 (0.033)  - - 
Mixed (%) 30.93 - 569 30.48 - 269 31.33 - 300 -0.85 (0.827) - - 
Incl. Stock (%) 60.11 - 569 55.39 - 269 64.33 - 300 -8.94
**
 (0.030) - - 
Hostile (%) 5.04 - 675 6.96 - 316 3.34 - 359 3.62
**
 (0.036)  - - 
Competing Bid (%) 7.85 - 675 11.39 - 316 4.74 - 359 6.66
***
 (0.002)  - - 
Tender Offer (%) 16.00 - 675 19.94 - 316 12.53 - 359 7.40
***
 (0.010)  - - 
Diversification (%) 34.07 - 675 34.18 - 316 33.98 - 359 0.19 (0.958)  - - 






Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
This table presents pairwise correlations of the variables. Panel A shows correlations of acquirer gains, activist involvement, acquirer firm characteristics, and deal characteristics. Panel 
B shows correlations of target gains, activist involvement, target firm characteristics, and deal characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Bid Premiums are winsorized if 
values are beyond the range of [0, 2]. Other continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. 
 
Panel A: Correlations of Acquirer Gains, Activist Involvement, Acquirer Firm Characteristics and Deal Characteristics 
 CAR 
[-2,2] 









CAR [-2,2] 1.000 
 
 
             
BHAR24 -0.044 1.000  
             
Activist 0.106 0.024 1.000              
MV 0.022 0.032 -0.029 1.000 
            
M/B 0.080 -0.055 -0.041 0.192 1.000 
           
Leverage 0.047 0.075 -0.029 0.014 -0.005 1.000 
          
CF/E 0.030 0.164 0.028 0.031 -0.106 0.097 1.000 
         
RUNUP 0.055 -0.135 0.059 -0.015 0.422 -0.069 -0.140 1.000 
        
Sigma -0.032 -0.095 -0.027 -0.242 0.209 -0.118 -0.456 0.299 1.000 
       
TV -0.140 0.001 -0.029 0.291 0.134 0.096 0.089 0.044 -0.119 1.000 
      
Relative Size -0.213 -0.091 0.047 -0.222 -0.068 0.032 -0.004 -0.008 0.228 0.231 1.000 
     
Cash 0.103 0.183 0.085 0.228 0.010 -0.170 0.155 -0.082 -0.277 -0.120 -0.336 1.000 
    
Hostile -0.054 0.005 0.096 -0.016 0.007 0.110 0.121 0.045 -0.016 0.190 0.110 -0.028 1.000 
   
Competing Bid -0.021 0.106 0.135 -0.005 -0.031 0.037 0.128 0.027 -0.058 0.067 0.174 0.068 0.243 1.000 
  
Tender Offer 0.116 0.047 0.069 0.007 0.053 -0.101 0.028 -0.022 -0.035 -0.014 -0.070 0.258 0.070 0.125 1.000 
 



















CAR [-2,2] 1.000 
 
 
             
Bid Premium 0.632 1.000  
             
Activist -0.051 -0.017 1.000              
MV -0.176 -0.129 -0.008 1.000 
            
M/B -0.073 -0.043 0.032 0.196 1.000 
           
Leverage -0.143 -0.037 -0.014 0.145 -0.052 1.000 
          
CF/E -0.142 -0.226 -0.032 0.092 0.057 0.105 1.000 
         
RUNUP -0.083 -0.084 0.055 0.022 0.283 0.067 0.078 1.000 
        
Sigma 0.245 0.318 -0.047 -0.210 0.065 -0.137 -0.497 0.129 1.000 
       
TV -0.135 -0.049 -0.009 0.813 0.232 0.184 0.120 0.052 -0.217 1.000 
      
Relative Size -0.238 -0.063 0.066 0.149 -0.052 0.263 0.127 -0.023 -0.112 0.249 1.000 
     
Cash 0.286 0.082 0.031 -0.156 -0.022 -0.314 -0.006 0.074 0.023 -0.152 -0.383 1.000 
    
Hostile -0.041 0.014 0.082 0.174 0.046 0.061 0.057 0.033 -0.100 0.246 0.150 -0.039 1.000 
   
Competing Bid -0.057 0.174 0.110 0.131 -0.022 0.021 0.065 0.032 -0.074 0.171 0.202 0.046 0.289 1.000 
  
Tender Offer 0.158 0.164 0.049 0.039 0.041 -0.158 -0.023 0.050 0.041 -0.016 -0.094 0.285 0.087 0.181 1.000 
 






Table 4. Gains to acquirers from M&A deals 
 
This table presents acquirers’ short- and long-term gains. Panel A shows acquirers’ announcement abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns around the announcements. Panel B shows acquirers’ post-announcement long-term returns. BHAR24 is the 24-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns after the announcement. 
Variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. P-Values are shown in parentheses. T-test is used to test the significance of the mean CARs, and the difference in the mean CARs. 
Bootstrapped standard error is used in the t-test to test the significance of the mean BHARs, and the difference in the means of BHARs. Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Wilcoxon 




Full Sample Activists Sample Matching Sample Difference (Activists – Matching) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
Panel A: Acquirers’ Announcement Abnormal Returns 
CAR [-2, 2] (%) 0.00 -0.15 675 0.78
*
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Table 5. Multivariate analysis of acquirers’ announcement gains 
 
Acquirers’ announcement abnormal returns (CAR [-2, 2]) are regressed (OLS) against a set of explanatory 
variables (Activist dummy, acquirer firm characteristics and deal characteristics). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. In all models, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled for. For brevity, their 
coefficients are not reported in the table. The number of observations used in different specifications may vary 
because of the missing value of one or more variable. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% 
levels. P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 




































































































   
(0.886) (0.859) 
Constant -0.0066 0.0146 -0.0323 -0.0373 
 
(0.807) (0.706) (0.179) (0.437) 
N 675 644 569 542 
R
2
 0.072 0.087 0.115 0.167 
Adj. R
2
 0.025 0.030 0.051 0.093 
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Table 6. Multivariate analysis of acquirers’ long-term performance 
 
Acquirers’ post-announcement buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR24) are regressed against a set of 
explanatory variables (activist dummy, acquirer firm characteristics and deal characteristics). Specifications 
1 to 4 show OLS regressions. Specifications 5 to 8 show quantile regressions. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. In all models, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled for. For brevity, their 
coefficients are not reported in the table. The number of observations used in different specifications may vary 
because of the missing value of one or more variable. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% 
levels. P-Values are shown in parentheses. In OLS regressions, p-values are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and acquirer clustering. In quantile regressions, p-values are calculated based on robust errors. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 OLS  Quantile Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 




















































































































































































































 0.1409 -0.1575  -0.2725
*
 -0.3494 -0.2086 0.1473 
 (0.049) (0.020) (0.598) (0.628)  (0.084) (0.133) (0.410) (0.609) 





 0.151 0.195 0.188 0.230  - - - - 
Adj. R
2
 0.093 0.125 0.114 0.142  - - - - 
Pseudo R
2
 - - - -  0.100 0.144 0.126 0.163 
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Table 7. Gains to targets from M&A deals 
 
This table presents the distribution of targets’ gains. Panel A shows targets’ announcement abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
around the announcements. CARs are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. Panel B shows Bid Premiums measured by difference between the offer price and the target stock price 4 
weeks before the announcement divided by the latter. Bid Premiums are winsorized if values are beyond the range of [0, 2]. P-Values are shown in parentheses. T-test is used to test 
the significance of the mean, and the difference in mean. Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test are used to test the significance of median and the difference in 
median, respectively. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 
Full Sample Activists Sample Matching Sample Difference (Activists – Matching) 
 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
 
Panel A: Targets’ Announcement Abnormal Returns 



















     
 
Panel B: Bid Premium 





Table 8. Multivariate analysis of targets’ gains 
 
Targets’ gains and Bid Premium are regressed against a set of explanatory variables (activist dummy, target firm 
characteristics and deal characteristics). All variables are defined in Appendix A. In all models, industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effects are controlled for. For brevity, their coefficients are not reported in the table. The number of 
observations used in different specifications may vary because of the missing value of one or more variable. Bid 
Premiums are winsorized if values are beyond the range of [0, 2]. Other continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% 
and 98% levels. P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 Targets’ CAR [-2, 2]  Bid Premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Activist -0.0197 -0.0170 -0.0311 -0.0188  0.0343 0.0235 0.0105 0.0012 




















































































































































(0.000) (0.024)  
  
(0.786) (0.588) 




    0.0360 0.0092 
   (0.001) (0.005)    (0.393) (0.841) 
Hostile 
  











































(0.664) (0.441)  
  
(0.080) (0.208) 
Constant 0.0658 0.0193 0.0662 -0.1843  0.0886 -0.4073 0.1079 -0.3613 
 (0.414) (0.880) (0.352) (0.202)  (0.628) (0.162) (0.541) (0.219) 
N 556 477 469 420  524 404 505 396 
R
2
 0.089 0.190 0.186 0.260  0.129 0.247 0.182 0.313 
Adj. R
2
 0.033 0.120 0.114 0.173  0.072 0.169 0.115 0.227 
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Table 9. Methods of payment and acquirers’ announcement gains 
 
Acquirers’ announcement period abnormal returns (CAR [-2, 2]) by the methods of payment are regressed (OLS) 
against a set of explanatory variables (activist dummy, acquirer firm characteristics and deal characteristics). All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. In all models, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled for. For 
brevity, their coefficients are not reported in the table. The number of observations used in different specifications may 
vary because of the missing value of one or more variable. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% 
levels. P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
 Cash Only Deals  Non-cash Deals 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 


























































































































































































 0.0029 0.0432  -0.0225 -0.0455 0.0130 -0.0262 
 (0.905) (0.016) (0.938) (0.138)  (0.472) (0.388) (0.704) (0.639) 
N 227 219 227 219  342 323 342 323 
R
2
 0.147 0.216 0.158 0.233  0.103 0.142 0.150 0.225 
Adj. R
2
 0.012 0.056 -0.001 0.050  0.010 0.027 0.046 0.106 
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Table 10. Multivariate analysis of payment methods 
 
Payment methods are regressed against a set of explanatory variables (activist dummy, acquirer firm characteristics and 
deal characteristics). In specifications 1 to 4 (Probit model), the dependent variable is the cash payment dummy that 
takes a value of one if the deal is settled by 100% cash. In specifications 5 to 8 (fractional Probit model), the dependent 
variable is the percentage of consideration paid in cash. All variables are defined in Appendix A. In all models, industry 
fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled for. For brevity, their coefficients are not reported in the table. The 
number of observations used in different specifications may vary because of the missing value of one or more variable. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and 
* respectively. 
 
 Probit: Cash  Fractional Probit: % Cash 






















































































































































































































































 (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.154)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 569 542 569 542  569 542 569 542 
Pseudo R
2







Table 11. Types of activist and gains from acquisitions  
 
Announcement period abnormal returns of acquirers (CAR [-2, 2] in specifications 1 to 5) and returns of targets (CAR [-2, 2] in specifications 6 to 10) are 
regressed (OLS) against a set of explanatory variables. The hedge fund dummy equals 1 if an activist is a hedge fund and 0 otherwise. The multiple activists 
dummy equals 1 if a target has multiple activists and 0 otherwise. The serial activist dummy equals 1 if an activist has performed five or more activist 
campaigns over three years before the current deal and 0 otherwise. The sector-diversified activist dummy equals 1 if an activist invests in multiple sectors 
identified by the first two digits of the primary SIC codes and 0 otherwise. The Delaware dummy equals 1 if an activist is registered in Delaware and 0 
otherwise. Firm characteristics include Ln(MV), M/B, Leverage, CF/E, RUNUP, and Sigma and deal characteristics include Relative Size of the Deal, Hostile, 
Tender Offer, Competing Bid, and Diversification. All firm and deal specific variables are defined in Appendix A. In all equations, industry fixed effects and 
year fixed effects are controlled for but for brevity, their coefficients are not reported in the table. The number of observations used in different specifications 
may vary because of the missing value of one or more variable(s). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. P-Values shown in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted as ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
 
 Acquirer CAR [-2, 2]  Target CAR [-2, 2] 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Hedge Fund 0.0010 
    
 -0.0270 
    
 
(0.921) 
    
 (0.400) 








   
  
(0.796) 

























   
-0.0663 
 










    
0.0078  
    
0.0184 
     
(0.518)  
    
(0.550) 
Acquirer Firm Characteristics √ √ √ √ √       
Target Firm Characteristics       √ √ √ √ √ 
Deal Characteristics √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ 
Constant 0.0093 0.0102 0.0035 0.0023 0.0039  -0.1339 -0.1755 -0.1766 -0.1246 -0.1967 
 
(0.898) (0.888) (0.962) (0.974) (0.957)  (0.529) (0.372) (0.369) (0.548) (0.330) 
N 255 255 255 255 255  209 209 209 209 209 
R-sq 0.267 0.267 0.271 0.271 0.269  0.348 0.348 0.346 0.359 0.347 




Appendix A: Definition of variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Gains to Acquirers and Targets 
CAR [-2, 2] Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement over 5-days [-2, 2] 
surrounding the day of deal announcement.  
BHAR24 Post-merger buy-and-hold abnormal returns in 24 months. 
Bid Premium Difference between the offer price and the target stock price 4 weeks before the announcement 
divided by the latter. 
 
Panel B: Key Explanatory Variable 
Activist Dummy variable equals one if takeover target is an activist target firm. 
 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
MV Market value of the firm 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP items PRC×SHROUT). 
Ln(MV) Natural logarithm of MV. 
M/B 
 
Market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP items PRC×SHROUT) divided 
by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item CEQ). 




Cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat items IB+DP-DVP-DVC) 
divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP items 
PRC×SHROUT). 
RUNUP Market-adjusted CARs before the announcement of the deal, [-365, -28] days window. 
Sigma The standard deviation of a firm’s market-adjusted daily abnormal return prior to the 
announcement [-365, -28]. 
 
Panel D: Deal Characteristics 
TV Transaction value of the M&A deal (from Thomson One Banker). 
Relative Size Transaction value (from Thomson One Banker) divided by the acquirer’s MV (defined above). 
Cash Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid in cash, and 0 otherwise. 
Stock Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid in stock, and 0 otherwise. 
Mix Dummy variable equals one if deal is paid in cash and stock, and 0 otherwise. 




The percentage of consideration paid in cash (from Thomson One Banker). 
Dummy variable equals one if the deal attitude is hostile or unsolicited in Thomson One Banker. 
Competing Bid Dummy variable equals one if there is more than one bidder reported in Thomson One Banker. 
Tender Offer Dummy variable equals one if the deal is identified as a tender offer in Thomson One Banker. 
Diversification Dummy variable equals one if the bidder and the target have different first two-digits of the 




Appendix B: Description of activist type 
 
Following Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015), we classify activist investors’ type as follows: 
 
Activist Type Definition 
Hedge Funds Hedge fund manager or sponsor, a private investment fund or partnership 
Industrial Owner Firms that own an equity stake in the target firm; all corporations excluding those in the 
financial sector 
Investment Managers Managers who manage asset portfolios of private clients; includes both financial advisors and 
consultants 
Individual Investors Single individual, who is usually a shareholder of the target company 
Investment Companies Mutual funds, both closed-end and open-end 
Financial Institutions Mostly different types of bank, such as commercial banks, savings banks etc.; includes 
broker-dealers 
Private Equity Companies Includes both private equity funds and private equity investors 
Pension funds Funds such as CalPERS that are retirement systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
